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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between performance and risk exposure for 
mutual funds. The preliminary analysis fails to support the tournament hypothesis, 
which predicts that poorly performing managers will increase risk exposure while 
outperforming managers will decrease risk exposure. Instead, we find evidence of risk 
reduction for extreme losers and risk increase for winning managers. Besides, the 
risk-taking fails to align manager interest with shareholder interest since the returns 
from the risk enhancement by winners and the risk reduction by losers is relatively 
worse than those with contradictory strategies. Overall, the competition among fund 
managers appears to affect management risk choice, and in turn has an effect on future 
performance. However, the effect of shifting risk on fund performance and the 
approach of altering portfolio risk vary with fund style and prior performance. 
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 Chapter 1 
Introduction  1
1. Introduction 
 
As the pioneering work of Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), the risk-taking behavior 
of mutual fund managers in response to their relative performance has attracted great 
attention. Conventional wisdom suggests that fund managers who trail the market in the 
first half of the year may be tempted to increase a portfolio’s volatility to catch up with 
the market, and fund managers who are ahead of the market have an incentive to lock in 
their winner status (e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996; Koski and Pontiff, 1999; 
Goriaev, Palomino, and Prat, 2002). This is often referred to as the “Tournament 
Hypothesis”. These authors argue that these results arise from the empirical findings 
that the outperforming funds receive a larger inflow of capital, but mutual funds with 
worse performance do not experience as significant an outflow of capital (e.g., Ippolito, 
1992; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Goetzmann and Peles, 1997; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; 
Sawicki, 2001). This asymmetric flow-performance relation thereby creates incentives 
for fund managers to alter the risk exposure of their portfolios. 
 
However, recent empirical evidence suggests that there is mixed evidence on how 
prior performance affects a mutual fund manager’s risk choice. For example, Chevalier 
and Ellison (1997) find that the worst performing funds have the lowest risk-taking 
incentives, while the funds with higher interim returns increase their risk. Similarly, 
Daniel and Wermers (2000), Busse (2001), and Goriaev, Palomino, and Prat (2002),   2
Wei Li and Ashish Tiwari (2006) provide evidence that the level of risk exposure in the 
latter part of the year is positively related to the performance over the first part of the 
year. These findings are difficult to reconcile with the intuition that winning managers 
moderate risk to maintain their high rankings and losing managers enhance risk to catch 
up with the market. 
 
The key idea in these studies is the asymmetric flow-performance relation between 
winners and losers. Nevertheless, in addition to the incentives to attract new assets into 
the fund, there are other possible responses to intra-period performance. For example, 
according to attribution analysis, it is possible that winners will increase risk more than 
losers because winners might be more confident (Heider, 1958; Chen and Pennacchi, 
2001). It is also perceived that a number of fund managers with poor performance 
change their fund styles to reduce risk exposure and to potentially improve 
performance (Cooper, Gulen, and Rau, 2003). Furthermore, in the context of the 
call-like feature, fund managers have incentives to increase portfolio volatility 
regardless of past performance (e.g., Grinblatt and Titman, 1989a; Carpenter, 2000). 
Finally, fund managers are faced with career risks when engaging in risk-taking 
behavior if the relative performance is consistently behind the market (e.g., Khorana, 
1996; Goetzmann and Peles, 1997; Fung and Hsieh, 2000; Khorana, 2001; Lynch and 
Musto, 2003; Qiu, 2003). As a result, a fund manager with consistently poor 
performance will have an incentive to reduce the risk exposure to avoid damage to their 
career.   3
 
In addition, past studies have focused on prior current year performance e.g., 
half-year (Koski and Pontiff, 1999), seven months (Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996), 
or prior nine months returns (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). While mutual fund inflows 
during a given year depend on past-year performance, and not simply on the 
current-year performance (e.g., Ippolito, 1992; Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Specifically, a 
fund manager with consistently poor performance will have an incentive to reduce the 
risk exposure to avoid the unemployment risk. In contrast, a fund manager with 
relatively good performances in the past few years but poor ones in the past few months 
will tend to increase the risk exposure to catch up with the market. Moreover, as noted 
by Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), the fund managers in the median losers do not 
uniformly raise the absolute risk level of the funds after an interim assessment date. 
Then it is reasonable to conjecture that losers (winners) with different degree of interim 
worse (better) performance will have different risk-shifting behavior. To better isolate 
extreme winners and losers, we use quartile-based rather than medium-based 
definitions of winners and losers since it is extreme losers instead of medium losers 
who have higher a probability of termination and extreme winners in the top ranking 
will have more reputation benefits and greater cash inflows. 
 
With above additional insights, this paper intends to reconcile the seemingly 
contradictory findings of Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Busse (2001) and Goriaev, 
Palomino, and Prat (2002) by examining the future relative risk choices for all levels of   4
prior return performance measured over varying time horizons. Overall, our results 
provide very little support for the tournament hypothesis, a result similar to Daniel and 
Wermers (2000), Goriaev, Palomino, and Prat (2002), and Qiu (2003). In particular, 
funds that are well ahead of the market may have a strong incentive to gamble, whereas 
funds that are behind the market may want to reduce their risk. This evidences support 
to the idea that both call-like features of payoffs and the prediction of attribution 
analysis that provides an explanation about the risk-taking behaviors of the winners. 
Moreover, the threat of being fired plays a significant role in modifying incentives to 
take risk of the losers. Besides, it is worth noting that the risk reduction is only 
significant for extreme losers and risk enhancement is prevalent in medium winners. 
This confirms the prediction that losers (winners) with different degree of interim 
worse (better) performance will have different risk-shifting behaviors. From the 
U-shaped risk-return pattern of Brown, et al (1997), the originally higher risk makes it 
impossible for extreme winners to further increase risk toward the end of the year, and it 
also makes the extreme losers decrease risk exposure to reduce the likelihood of being 
fired. 
 
Furthermore, understanding the post risk-taking effects in a mutual fund industry is 
important since fund investors may want to know whether the change of risk-taking 
alters future fund performance. Therefore, we further examine whether the 
performance of mutual fund changes as a result of risk-taking behavior. To my best 
knowledge, no literature addresses this issue. Accordingly, this paper also tries to fill in   5
this gap. We show that the risk enhancement by winners and the risk reduction by losers 
decrease the relatively subsequent performance in comparison with the contradictory 
strategies taken by winners and losers. Partially, we find that managers appear to act in 
a manner consistent with their own best interest, but not necessarily that of their 
investors. 
 
Finally, the effects of risk shifting on fund performance vary with fund style. 
Specifically, irrespective of prior performance, the shareholders of aggressive growth 
funds can benefit from the risk enhancing, and risk reduction will be better for growth 
and income funds. The method with which fund managers alter portfolio risk also 
varies with fund style and prior performance. In particular, regardless of prior 
performance and fund style, fund managers will increase exposure to market factor to 
raise their risk exposure. However, their adjustment about the other factor loadings is 
quite complex and varies with fund style and prior performance.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 review the 
related literature and describes testable hypotheses. Section 4 and 5 present the data 
and methodology. Section 6 shows the empirical results, where Section 6.1 displays the 
results of the contingency table; Section 6.2 runs the regression equation to make the 
robust analysis; Section 6.3 investigates if risk-taking can improve or lock in 
performance; Section 6.4 examines where risk is shifted; Section 7 makes a conclusion.   6
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Compensation for mutual fund managers is often structured as a flat fee plus a 
percentage of assets under management. Under this call option-like payoff structure, 
this asymmetric flow-performance relation implies that outperforming managers will 
be rewarded with higher compensation, but managers earning worse returns are not 
penalized with lower fees. In consequence, this asymmetric flow-performance relation 
creates incentives for fund managers to alter the risk of their portfolios (e.g., Brown, 
Harlow, and Starks, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Koski and Pontiff, 1999; 
Sawicki, 2001). Several studies have identified a convex flow-performance 
relationship, because mutual fund investors tend to invest in funds with stellar 
performance and do not penalize poor performance equivalently. Fund managers have 
therefore an incentive to take excessive risk to increase future expected fund inflows 
because their compensation depends primarily on the assets under management. This 
incentive to shift risk is particularly strong in time periods in which flows are highly 
sensitive to an incremental change in performance. The interim under-performing 
managers will increase the risk during the rest of the year in order to improve their 
ranking by the end of year. In contrast, those managers who perform better in the first 
part of the year wish to maintain their high returns and will have incentive to reduce 
their risk positions.  
   8
A growing handful of literature studied the mutual fund tournament both 
theoretically and empirically. Much theoretical literature documents that the 
asymmetric payoffs of call-like feature make it more attractive for managers to 
undertake risky projects since an increase in the volatility of an option makes it more 
valuable (e.g., Grintblatt and Titman, 1989; Defusco, Johnson, and Zorn, 1990; 
Huddrat, 1999; Hvide, 1999; Carpenter, 2000; Palomino, 2002). A number of studies 
examine the risk taking behavior of mutual funds and support the tournament 
hypothesis from an empirical point of view (e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996; 
Koski and Pontiff, 1999; Goriaev, Nijman, and Werker, 2003, Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 
2003). Goriaev, Plaomono, and Prat (2002) further show that, in the second period, the 
interim loser will take more risk than the interim winner and the risk undertaken by the 
interim loser is increasing with the difference in interim performances. 
 
Nevertheless, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) find a positive correlation between 
interim performance in excess of a benchmark and increases in subsequent tracking 
error volatility. Chen and Pennacchi (2001) show an increase in the tracking error of 
poor performing funds, but no increase in their return variance. Busse (2001) argues 
that ignoring the autocorrelation or the cross-dependencies in fund returns would lead 
to bias in the monthly volatility estimates. When considering either of these two effects, 
Busse (2001) finds that the evidence in favor of the tournament hypothesis based on 
monthly data disappears. Intuitively, daily data provide much more precise volatility 
estimates and hence tests based on daily data would be more powerful in examining   9
tournament hypothesis than tests based on monthly data. However, when accounting 
for the impacts of both autocorrelation and cross-correlation, Goriaev, Nijman, and 
Werker (2003) show that tests of the tournament hypothesis based on monthly data are 
in fact more robust to auto- and cross-correlation effects than tests based on daily data.  
 
Many authors have tried to theoretically reconcile the seemingly contradictory 
empirical findings in mutual fund tournament behavior. For example, Taylor (2003) 
shows that winners react to the risk enhancement of losers by also taking on more risk 
exposure, as a result midyear losers cannot increase the probability of becoming 
winners by increasing risk. Ross (2003) further argues that neither a convex nor a 
concave compensation schedule will make an agent more or less risk averse. Any fee 
schedule has several effects – convexity effect, translation effects, and magnificent 
effect. The convexity of a schedule like a call option will make risky bets more 
desirable because raising the volatility raise the market value of the options. But, 
beyond this, managers will have different attitudes towards risk at a higher level of 
wealth than at a lower level, and then the fee schedule will also shift or translate the 
evaluation of any bets to a different part of the domain of their utility function. These 
effects can enhance or offset the risk-taking incentives of managers, thereby making 
them more or less risk averse. Grinblatt and Titman (1989b) and Carpenter (2000) also 
shows that if the manager’s compensation is asymmetric and he can hedge his 
compensation, he would increase the fund volatility, but risk-taking is not necessarily 
increased if he cannot hedge.   10
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3. Testable hypothesis   
 
Apart from past returns, future risk taking behavior also depends on other factors. 
According to the attribution theory, it is possible that winners will increase risk more 
than losers because winners might be more confident. On the contrary, losers become 
risk averse due to worse performance (Heider, 1958; Chen and Pennacchi, 2001). 
Many past studies show analytically that the value of the fund managers’ contract 
increases with portfolio variance due to the call-like feature of the incentive contract 
(e.g., Grinblatt and Titman, 1989; Carpenter, 2000). Thus, in the context of the 
call-like feature, fund managers have incentives to increase portfolio variance 
regardless of past performance. 
 
On the other hand, fund managers are faced with career risks when engaging in 
risk-taking behavior if the relative performance is consistently behind the market. Past 
research provides evidence of the relation between poor performance and employment 
risk. For example, with a number of questionnaires taken from mutual fund investors, 
Goetzmann and Peles (1997) find that investors tend to switch from funds when it 
consistently performs poorly about 2.15 years. Khorana (1996) shows a negative 
relation between past performance and portfolio manager replacement. Khorana (2001) 
further documents that the replacement of poor managers is preceded by significant 
decreases in net new inflows in the fund. As a result, this manager may tend to reduce 
risk in the second half of the year to avoid further performance deterioration. Indeed,   12
Fung and Hsieh (2000) show that reputation concerns and contractual constraints may 
mitigate risk-increasing behavior. 
 
Intuitively, losers (winners) with different degree of interim worse (better) 
performance will have different risk-shifting behavior (Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 
1996). Accompanied with the reasons stated above, we intend to do further research 
by incorporating the fund manager’s career risk when facing consistent poor 
performance and confidence rising (decreasing) when facing good (bad) performance. 
If the career concerns are more important than the bonus for extreme losers when 
making risk choice, we would find a significant decrease in risk taking for extreme 
losers. As for medium losers, asymmetric payoffs of call-like feature would make 
fund managers prone to undertake risky investments since employment risk is 
relatively impossible at this stage. However, risk aversion due to worse performance 
will make medium losers decrease risk levels. Taking greater risk aversion and 
asymmetric payoffs together, it is possible to find no significant change in risk taking 
for medium losers. As a result, the following tournament hypotheses with regards to 
losers are tested: 
(1) Hypothesis 1: extreme losers would decrease risk in response to employment risk. 
(2) Hypothesis 2: medium losers would show no significant evidence of risk changing 
because of the complex effect from call-like feature of bonus compensation and the 
risk aversion due to worse performance. 
   13
On the other hand, if increase in confidence can explain investors’ behavior, 
winners will increase risk more than losers. Additionally, the bonus schemes received 
by fund managers almost always have both floors and ceilings and better performing 
funds usually have higher volatility (Brown, et al, 1997). Then, suppose that the 
relevant performance is near the ceiling, intuitively the manager will become more 
risk averse toward earnings in this case because more risk-taking will face a limited 
upward profit and a larger downward risk. Furthermore, within the context of higher 
risk in the first period, there also exists limited space for extreme winners to raise risk 
exposure. According to this line of reasoning, we will find no evidence of significant 
change in risk-taking behavior. Therefore, we also test the following tournament 
hypothesis regarding winners: 
(3) Hypothesis 3: medium winners would increase risk because of increase in 
confidence and in an effort to make more bonus compensation. 
(4) Hypothesis 4: extreme winners would show no significant evidence of risk 
changing because of higher risk in the first period and limited upward profit.   14
Chapter 4 
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4. Data 
 
We obtained the sample of mutual funds from Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund Database, which contains data on monthly 
returns, fees, the year of origin, and other characteristics of the fund. As in Brown, 
Harlow, and Starks (1996), we restricted our attention to US domestic equity funds. We 
included all diversified domestic equity funds in the CRSP database during 1962 to 
2006 with “Aggressive Growth (AG)”, “Long-term Growth (LG)”, and “Growth 
Income (GI)”, as the stated objectives. 
 
Here we apply the Lubos Pastor, Robert Stambaugh (2002)’s classification, using 
the information that the CRSP database provides about classifications by Wiesenberger 
(“OBJ”), ICDI (“ICDI OBJ”), and Strategic Insight (“SI OBJ”). Our classification is as 
follows: 
1. Small company growth -- OBJ: SCG, AGG, MCG
1; ICDI OBJ: AG, AGG; SI OBJ: 
SCG 
2. Long-term Growth -- OBJ: G, G-S, S-G, GRO, LTG; ICDI OBJ: LG; SI OBJ: GRO 
3. Growth and income - OBJ: GCI, G-I, G-I-S, G-S-I, I-G, I-G-S, I-S-G, S-G-I, S-I-G, 
GRI; ICDI OBJ: GI; SI OBJ: GRI 
 
                                                 
1  According to Investopedia (website), aggressive growth fund also commonly referred as a “maximum capital gains 
fund”, which is denoted as “MCG” in OBJ code.   16
[Insert Table I Here] 
 
Table 1 reports the total number of funds existing and the monthly returns within 
each investment objective subgroup and within each year ranging from 1962 to 2006 
for these three fund types. Clearly, the mutual funds have experienced huge growth. 
Among them, the increase in the long-term growth funds is more prevalent. The sheer 
increase in the number of funds available may cause investors to become overly 
dependent on mutual fund rating services to screen funds. In response to this, the ranks 
of fund performance are regularly published in the financial media and are often 
referred to in funds’ advertisements. Because these publications rate funds primarily on 
performance, this might affect the incentive of fund managers to alter portfolio risk to 
gain more compensation.   17
Chapter 5 
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5. Methodology 
 
This section outlines the empirical approach used to examine the relationship between 
a mutual fund’s performance and its choice of risk. Although some business 
publications and information services regularly rank funds every quarter, the most 
critical rankings are based on annual performance and are usually produced at the end 
of the year (Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996). As a consequence, we assume that the 
tournaments are held on an annual basis and only a fund with return data available for 
the entire year is included in a yearly tournament. 
 
For each of the forty-five annual samples, we created subgroups of interim winners 
and losers according to a fund’s return performance between January and month M. 
Since we have no prior reason to believe that investors determine a fund performance 
on the basis of the past six months, for each fund, we compute cumulative fund 
returns over varying periods (we allow month M to vary between June to August) and 
sort all funds on the basis of returns into four return performance groups within each 
investment objective. Specifically, for each fund in a given year, we calculate the 
M-month cumulative return as follows: 
 
1
(1 ) 1
M
jM ji
i
RTN r
=
= +− ∏   (1.1) 
In this equation  ji r  is the monthly change in the fund’s net asset value (NAV) plus 
distributions as reported by CRSP, which includes reinvested dividends form one   19
period to the next and NAVs are net of all management expenses, 12b-fee, and front 
and rear load fee. For each sample year, RTN for each fund is measured over periods 
ranging from June to August (M = 6, 7, and 8) and the funds are ranked according to 
their RTN. We separate the funds into quartile, and define the funds in the upper 
quartile to be extreme winners, in the second upper to be medium winners, in the 
lower quartile to be extreme losers, and in the second lower quartile to be medium 
losers. The interim loser and winner strategies are represented by the subscripts L and 
W, respectively, and the corresponding portfolio risk levels in the first and second sub 
periods are represented by  1 σ  and 2 σ . In the first stage, we would like to examine if 
the risk adjustment ratio for the interim losers will be greater than for the winners. 
That is, the hypothesis is: 
  02 1 2 1 :( / ) ( / ) LL WW H σ σσ σ >   (1.2) 
The fund i risk adjustment ratio, RAR, for a particular year is calculated as: 
 
12 12 22
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=
−− −
∑∑
 (1.3) 
For each year, equation (1.3) measures the ratio of the j-th fund’s standard 
deviation after M-month interim performance assessment relative to its standard 
deviation before that date. Then, we create a 4 × 2 contingency table in which each 
(RTN, RAR) pair is placed into one of the eight cells. We first test if each cell has the 
same percentage of the sample population (i.e., 12.5%) with a Chi-square test having 
three degrees of freedom. 
   20
Apart from the compensation-related incentives, managers tend to “window dress” 
their year-end portfolio composition for accounting or reporting purposes 
(Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny, 1991; Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996; 
Lee, Porter, and Weaver, 1998). Accordingly, we calculate RAR both with and 
without December returns. 
 
In addition, though the tournament hypothesis states that mutual fund managers that 
fall behind their peers might react to this by increasing their portfolio risk. However, a 
gradual increase in risk by repeated losers seems impossible, given that funds are 
constrained by their investment policies. Risk-increasing behavior might be 
negatively related with prior risk exposure since fund managers cannot consistently 
increase risk. Furthermore, because the losers with long-term poor performance will 
face the threat of dismissal, this will mitigate their incentives to engage in short-term 
gambles. As a result, the risk-taking behavior of mutual fund managers during the 
second period of a performance measurement period is conditional not only on 
first-period returns, but also on prior risk-taking behavior and prior longer-term 
returns. To take into account the potential impact from prior long-term performance, 
we examine the future relative risk choices of mutual funds for all levels of prior 
return performance measured over short (one year), long (three years) horizons. 
 
Along the same lines, there are also other factors that might impact on the 
risk-taking behavior of mutual fund managers, such as age, size, expense fee, load or   21
not, and turnover ratio. Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) show that the decision to 
terminate a young manager is more sensitive to recent performance than the 
termination decision for an older manager. Accordingly, younger managers will be 
subject to stronger career concerns, and current bad performances of young funds are 
more likely to influence investors’ decision than those of older funds with an 
extension history. Additionally, career concerns should be more compelling in the 
case. 
 
Accordingly, a regression is run to control potential effects from other factors. At 
the end of each year, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression for each 
fund objective group using the well-known Fama and Macbeth (1973) approach: 
 
,, 1 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 2 4 ,
5,6 ,7 , 9,
10 , ,
/
()
()
it it it it it it
it it it it
it it
Std Std ret std ret Size
Age Turn I Load Exp
IS i n g l e u
α ββ ββ
ββ β β
β
−− − − =+ + + +
++ + +
++
  (1.4) 
Where  ,, 1 / it it std std −  measures the change of future (12-M-1)-month standard 
deviation of returns;  ,1 it ret −  is past M-month returns,  ,1 it std − is past M-month 
standard deviation of returns,  ,2 it ret −   is the past one-year (three-year) returns.  , it Age  
and  , it Size  are the log of age and total net assets of fund i in period t, respectively; 
the fund’s age (Age) is equal to the number of years from a fund’s inception date to 
the end of the sample period, 2006. A negative coefficient for these variables would 
indicate that smaller and younger mutual funds adjust their overall risk level more 
than larger and older mutual funds. Turnover ratio (Turn) and expense ratio (exp) are 
also included. I( , it Load ) is the indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the fund has   22
front or deferred sales charges, 0 otherwise. The turnover ratio, a measure of the 
fund’s activity, is computed by taking the lesser of fund’s security purchases or sales 
and by dividing by average assets. The fund’s expense ratio is defined as the value of 
operating expense, management fees, and 12-b fee costs as a percentage of fund assets. 
I(Singlei,t) is the indicator variable that takes the value 1 if it is individual-managed 
fund, 0 if it is team-managed fund.   23
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6. Empirical Result 
6.1 Contingency table tests 
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
Table 2 and Table 3 present cell frequencies for each of several different experimental 
results using different subsample of data. In order to compare with BHS’s result, we 
separate the full sample into two sub-periods, i.e. 1962-1991 and 1992-2006. The 
contingency table 2 present the result of frequency distributions where we simply 
define loser and winner based on the previous performance measured by compound 
total return through the first 6 months of the year. The Risk Adjustment Ratio (RAR) is 
the standard deviation measured before and after June. As shown in table 2, the 
tournament phenomenon does exist during the first period, which confirms the BHS’s 
result. However, the latter part shows contradictory investment strategy that is losers 
lower the risk exposure and winner enhance the risk level after the interim performance 
ranking. Because of the sample period of the latter part, the full sample, i.e. 1962-2006, 
also exhibit non-tournament phenomenon, regardless of the fund style. 
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
  Table 3 gives further evidence by dividing winner and loser into 4 categories- 
Extreme Losers, Medium Losers, Extreme Winners and Medium Winners based on the   25
compound total return through the first 6 months of the year and then further divide 
them into eight groups according to whether RAR is above (High) or below (Low) the 
medium. Consistent with above finding, the result in previous period is that, extreme 
winners decrease the risk exposure and extreme losers increase the risk exposure. 
While either for full sample or for latter period, it is significant that extreme losers 
decrease risk exposure and medium winners take risky strategies in long-term growth 
fund and growth and income fund. For aggressive growth fund, extreme winners 
instead of medium winners increase risk level.  
 
Table 4 and Table 5 present cell frequencies for each of several different 
experimental designs using the entire sample of data. We calculate separate 
contingency tables for all combinations of performance assessment month M= 6, 7, and 
8; inclusion or exclusion of December returns; full sample and the stated objectives AG, 
LG, and GI. 
2 χ  statistics are computed based on the null hypothesis that each cell 
should be an equal distribution (i.e., 12.5%) of the sample.  
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
Table 4 indicates the consequences of including the set of December observations. 
Panel A lists results for the quartile-based winner/loser rankings of full sample, and 
Panel B to Panel D presents the result for three stated objectives. All the panels, either 
for the full sample or for other three types, reject the null hypothesis of equal frequency   26
whenever the interim performance rankings are conducted.  
 
Note that merely rejecting the null hypothesis of equal frequency among all eight 
cells in a particular table does not by itself constitute evidence in favor of the hypothesis 
of risk-shifting. To further test for statistically difference between percentages, the t test 
is used. The symbol “>” (“<”) means that the left (right) hand volatility measure is 
greater than the right (left) hand measure at the 0.05 significance level, respectively. A 
look at the table finds that the winners won’t consistently decrease their risk and the 
losers won’t consistently raise their risk. Specifically, extreme under-performing funds 
(extreme losers) take on lower relative risk, while medium winners and extreme 
winners tend to increase risk. The risk-decreasing behavior of extreme losers after the 
mid-year holds for all fund categories. Furthermore, the risk enhancement of above 
medium winners also holds regardless of fund categories. Note that medium losers 
show little risk changes whatever the risk-adjustment is measured based on which 
month, except for AG at Aug. For panel C and D, although extreme winners only in 
growth and income funds increase their risk exposure at Aug, extreme winners in other 
fund categories and in other months show no significant evidence of risk adjustment. 
However, for Aggressive Growth fund, extreme winners are more likely to increase risk 
exposure. This finding confirms the notion that managers revise their investment 
strategies following the release of their performance rankings. Extreme losers have the 
tendency to lower their risk exposure and medium winners rather than extreme winners 
tend to enhance their risk exposure. Overall, funds that are well ahead of the market   27
may have a strong incentive to gamble, whereas funds that are behind the market may 
want to reduce their risk, a result consistent with the findings of Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997). In a related area of study, the model of Chen and Pennacchi (2001), which 
predicts that when fund managers perform relatively better, they become more 
confident, but they become risk averse due to worse performance, also can explain the 
risk-increasing behavior of winners and risk-deduction of losers, especially for extreme 
winners in Aggressive growth fund who tend to be so “aggressive” that applying more 
risky strategies in order to be fund stars. Table 5 shows that the absence of December 
returns appears to almost the same phenomenon, but for all categories, medium winner 
significantly increase risk exposure, while extreme winner appears insignificant when 
the risk-adjustment is measured based on June. Overall, the direction without 
December observations is the same as those with December returns. This implies that 
the “window dressing” behavior in December has no large impact on the observations 
of tournament.  
 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
Above results confirm the view that the employment risk and impairment of future 
compensation may induce the extreme poor performing managers to reduce risk on the 
latter part of the year. Nevertheless, medium losers show no significant evidence of risk 
changing. The complex effect from risk aversion due to worse performing and the 
convexity of compensations explain this phenomenon (Chen and Pennacchi, 2001).   28
Consistent with the prediction of the attribution theory, outperforming managers will 
increase risk because they become more confident when they win (Heider, 1958; Chen 
and Pennacchi, 2001). This also confirms with the convexity of fund flows and 
compensation found by most empirical studies, such as Sirri and Tufano (1998). 
Whereas, extreme outperforming managers have no incentive to change risk exposure. 
One possible explanation is the argument of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) 
that successful managers attempt to lock-in gains and the existence of the maximum 
performance compensation level to their contracts may bind their incentives to further 
escalate the portfolio risk. Another one comes from the U-shaped risk-return pattern of 
Brown, et al (1997), in which both unusually low and unusually high returns pick out 
the high-variance funds. Given the higher risk of winners, it seems impossible for them 
to increase risk by a larger amount because of the constraint of their investment policies. 
Then there exists no significant risk-changing behavior for extreme winners. 
 
6.2 Regression results 
 
To this point, we have implicitly assumed that fund managers alter their risk exposure 
solely based on interim performance rankings. In reality, the risk adjustment will 
depend on factors such as a manager’s record of past year performance, size, age, 
team-managed or not, and load or not. To examine this prediction, we use regression 
analysis to characterize the risk-taking as a function of fund attributes. Through this   29
section, White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used because 
the residuals are heteroskedastic either by White (1980) test at the 1% significance 
level. 
 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
As can be seen from the full sample in Table 6, the positive coefficients of  ,1 it ret −  
reveal that, after controlling for other factors, losers tend to reduce risk in response to 
interim poor performance, but winners have a tendency to engage in higher risk taking 
to get more rewards. This phenomenon mainly holds in aggressive growth funds. This 
result is consistent with the prediction of the attribution theory, instead of with the 
tournament hypothesis. When other factors are considered, midyear performance has 
little effect on subsequent risk choice of long-term growth funds. However, growth and 
income funds tend to show evidence supporting the tournament hypothesis. 
Furthermore, regardless of fund types, the fund choice of risk in the latter part of the 
year is negatively related to interim risk in the early part of the year. This is reasonable 
since the manager who has gambled chooses to unwind his position, hence a lower 
relative risk ratio than a manager who has not gambled.  
 
In addition, for aggressive growth funds, fund choice of risk in the second half of the 
year is not only positively related to the performance over the first half of the year, but 
also positively connected with the performance over past years. This phenomenon   30
holds regardless of past performance measured based on one, three years. Similarly, the 
risk taking behaviors of growth and income funds are also positively related with the 
past one-year returns.  
 
Apart from past risk taking and past performance, the adjustment of fund’s risk level 
in the latter period also depends on other variables. As shown in Table 6, after 
controlling for other variables, the positive coefficient on size of long-term growth 
funds indicates that the larger the long-term growth fund, the more likely it is to gamble 
by a larger amount. This contradicts with Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), who stated 
that managers in smaller funds tend to engage in taking more risk in response to 
fund-flow incentives. Also, the younger the long-term growth funds are, the more 
incentives the fund managers have to raise risk exposure, a result consistent with 
Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999b). Funds with 
greater turnover ratio and higher expense ratio also have incentives to increase their risk 
taking. Besides, multiple-managed aggressive growth funds would have more incentive 
to increase risk exposure due to the risk sharing between managers. This is in line with 
Barry and Starks (1984) that funds managed by multiple managers may take higher 
additional risk since it is hard to differentiate who is responsible for a fund’s failure. 
Nevertheless, variables such as load fee seem unrelated to the decision of risk shifting 
during the sample period. 
   31
6.3 Compensation from risk-shifting 
 
The above section contends that, towards the end of the year, losers tend to decrease 
their risk due to the consideration of the employment risk and impairment of future 
compensation, while winners have a propensity to increase their risk because they 
become more confident. Accompanied with the document of DeSilva, Sapra, and 
Thorley (2001), that change over time in the cross-sectional variation in mutual fund 
returns is largely driven by the changing cross-sectional variation in individual stock 
volatility, an issue of great interest to investors is whether, within the winner groups, 
fund managers taking larger volatility bets exhibit better performance than those taking 
less volatility, or by contrast, if, within the loser groups, fund managers taking less 
volatility exhibit better performance than those taking larger volatility. In other words, 
this section would like to examine if mutual fund shareholders are compensated for 
fund managers’ risk shifting behavior.  
 
Understanding the post risk-changing effects in a mutual fund setting is useful for a 
number of constituents. 1) Fund advisors, who are compensated based on the 
percentage of outstanding asset, may be interested in knowing whether managerial risk 
change dramatically alters the pattern of asset inflows in the post risk-changing period. 
2) Fund investors may want to know whether the change in risk-taking behavior may 
alter fund performance. Specifically, fund investors may want to know if the losers can 
really become part of the top half of managers by taking on more risk.    32
 
To examine whether underperforming funds can turn around their performance by 
changing risk-taking, we first sort funds in the same objective into quartiles based on 
past M (M=6) months’ relative returns. Then within every return quintile, we further 
divide funds into two groups based on risk-increase or risk-decrease during the second 
part of the year. We compare the difference in the performance between risk-increasing 
and risk-decreasing funds within every return quartile. In this section, we apply the 
latter period, i.e. 1992-2006 where this evidence inconsistent with tournament is most 
significant based on the table 2 and 3.   
 
To measure the mutual fund performance’s difference between increasing risk and 
decreasing risk within the same quartile, we compare the average raw returns. To 
understand whether or not the results are robust to risk-adjusted measurement, we 
further compute the risk-adjusted returns with CAPM model and Carhart four-factor 
model. The four factor loadings are also obtained from the CRSP database. The 
one-factor alpha and the four-factor alpha are given by the  1 α  and  4 α . In the 
following models, respectively. 
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Where  t R  is the equal-weighted average return on fund with the same categories in 
month t,  ft R  is the risk-free rate in month t proxy by three-month T-bill,  mt R  is the 
return on a market portfolio in month t,  t SMB  is the returns on portfolios of small 
minus large firms in month t,  t HML  is the returns on portfolio of high minus low   33
book-to-market stocks in month t, and  t UMD  is the rate of return on portfolio of high 
minus low momentum stocks in month t.  
 
In order to compare the performance after risk shifting, we divide the sample into 4 
categories like previous frequency distribution test, say, extreme winner, medium 
winner, extreme loser, medium loser. Then we separate each category into two parts 
based on RAR measure, noted as Increasing risk and Decreasing Risk. Therefore the 
above regression is estimated with time series returns in the latter part of the year for 
each category to obtain the intercept estimations. We then test whether the alphas 
between increasing-risk fund and decreasing-risk fund are different. We apply 
F-statistic to determinate whether or not there exists the statistical significance of the 
difference in risk-adjusted performance. 
 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
 
Table 7 displays the average returns, one-factor alpha, four-factor alpha, their 
difference, and their corresponding F-values within the same quartile. Panel A shows 
the results of full sample, and Panel B to Panel D present the results of aggressive 
growth funds, long-term growth funds, and growth and income funds, respectively. As 
shown in Panel A, for the full sample, although the fund managers in both winners and 
losers categories cannot have significantly better raw returns by increasing risk 
exposure, all of the differences are positive. Even when based on the performance   34
estimates from the one-factor alpha and four-factor alpha, managers exhibit better 
risk-adjusted returns by increasing risk exposure for all categories. 
 
Additionally, Panel B to Panel D show that the shareholders’ compensation from 
risk-shift varies with fund style. From Panel B, fund managers in aggressive growth 
funds can improve performance by increasing risk exposure. Similar results about the 
aggressive growth funds are found when abnormal returns are measured based on either 
a one-factor model or a four-factor model, particularly in losers. Nonetheless, the 
return of long-term growth funds between increasing risk and decreasing risk differs 
with prior performance. In particular, by increasing risk, extreme winners in this style 
have larger raw returns, but medium winners have much smaller average returns. This 
phenomenon also holds when the performance is measured based on both the 
one-factor model and the four-factor alpha. Moreover, the medium winner’s 
performance also becomes worse by taking more risk. Though the raw returns of the 
medium losers in long-term growth funds are not improved by taking on more risk, 
extreme losers in this type have positive risk-adjusted returns by taking on more risk 
and extreme winners in this type also perform better by engaging in more risk-taking. 
With regard to growth and income funds, both winners and medium losers don’t 
perform better by increasing risk exposure, while extreme losers become only slightly 
better than before. However, one-factor alpha and four-factor alpha prevail that the 
risk-adjustment makes the worse performance for increasing risk become more 
prevalent. Specifically, regardless of winners or losers, it seems better for growth and   35
income funds to reduce their risk exposure.  
 
In additional analysis, we compare the return difference between different fund 
styles but among the same quartile. Overall, it can be found that the performance of 
aggressive growth funds is most affected by the choice of risk. For example, by taking 
on more risk, aggressive growth funds have the largest returns (0.42%), long-term 
growth funds have the second largest returns (0.132%), and growth and income funds 
have the lowest returns (0.016%). we find similar results when based on both the 
one-factor model (0.40% > 0.07% > -0.06%) and the four-factor alpha (0.266% > 
0.042% > -0.05%).  
 
Intuitively, investors and fund managers in funds with a conservative risk attitude 
(e.g., growth and income funds) care more about the risk arising from the long-term 
price volatility, but less about the short-term price volatility (Wilcox, 2003). As a result, 
they are dull in adjusting their portfolio composition and their performance won’t 
change significantly due to the risk-shifting behavior. In contrast, because actively 
managed funds focus on the rapid growth of fund value, their fund investors are more 
concerned about the short-term price volatility. In response to this, actively managed 
funds such as aggressive growth funds tend to be most affected by the choice of risk.  
 
In summary, regardless of winners or losers, it is better for aggressive growth funds 
to raise their risk exposure and for growth and income funds to reduce their risk   36
exposure. Extreme losers and extreme winners in long-term growth funds can gain 
more profits by gambling more, but gamble more will hurt the performance of medium 
losers and medium winners in this fund style. In comparison with the results in Table 4 
and Table 5, the risk-decreasing behavior of extreme losers in aggressive growth funds 
seems not to accord with the benefits of their shareholders. Furthermore, the 
risk-reducing behavior of extreme losers and risk-enhancing behavior of medium 
winners is also not in line with the benefits of shareholders in long-term growth funds. 
Finally, medium winners in growth and income funds also fail to act for the benefits of 
their shareholders since they gamble by a large amount. Above results imply that there 
exists a non-trivial agency problem between the shareholders and fund managers since 
the risk enhancement by winners and the risk reduction by losers relatively decrease the 
subsequent performance. 
 
6.4 How to shift the risk 
 
Fama and French (1992; 1993) argue that market factor, size, and book-to-market ratio 
play a dominant role in explaining cross-sectional differences in returns. Carhart (1997) 
further uses a momentum factor as additional benchmark returns. Fama and French 
conventional wisdom documents high returns as a reward for taking on high risk. This 
means that more risk-prone fund managers must hold more small stocks, more value 
stocks, and follow a positive feedback trading. Furthermore, Busse (2001) presents that   37
90% of the change in fund standard deviation arises from changes in the volatility of 
risk factors (market, size, book-to-market, momentum). As a result, it is conjectured 
that fund managers will raise the loading on these factors in an attempt to obtain higher 
returns.  
 
To understand where the fund managers will shift their risk taking, Table 8 presents 
the relative changes in the coefficients of the Carhart four-factor model in regression 
(6). That is, to test the following null hypothesis: 
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The estimates of  1 β  measures portfolio risk due to covariance the market portfolio, 
and the acceptance of  1 H  would indicate that, during the latter part of the year, fund 
managers who increase risk raise their systematic risk exposure more than those 
decreasing risk. The estimate of  2 β  measures risk associated with the size of firms 
held in a portfolio, and the acceptance of  2 H  would indicate that increasing-risk fund 
managers increase their holding shares of smaller-sized stocks more than 
decreasing-risk counterparts. The estimate of  3 β  measures risk associated with the 
book-to-market of firms held in a portfolio, and if  3 H  is accepted, it indicates that 
increasing-risk fund managers hold more value stocks during the second part of the year. 
The estimate of  4 β  measures risk associated with following a positive feedback 
strategy, and if  4 H  is accepted, it indicates that increasing-risk fund managers would   38
follow the positive trend-trading strategy more significantly than decreasing-risk 
counterparts. 
 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
 
Table 8 presents the difference between the betas of ones increasing risk exposure 
and ones of funds decreasing risk exposure about the Carhart’s (1997) four-factor 
portfolio for various fund types. Panels A, B, and C show the results for aggressive 
growth funds, long-term growth funds, and growth and income funds, respectively. To 
test for statistical difference between percentages, the F-statistics are used. The 
symbols “*” means that the difference are significant measured at the 0.05 significance 
level, respectively. As for aggressive growth funds, the results in the (Rm-Rf) column 
show that all except extreme loser raise their risk exposure by engaging in more 
systematic risk taking. However, both winner and losers reduce their loading of 
systematic risk to decrease their risk level. From the SML column, all in aggressive 
growth funds tend to increase their holdings of small stocks. This holds whether they 
are loser or winner. As for medium winners and extreme winners, they tend to hold 
smaller shares of smaller stocks when they decrease risk. Though the ones in this group 
tend to increase risk exposure show no significant changes of relative factor loadings in 
HML factor, all risk-decreasing excluding extreme winners increase their factor 
loadings in HML factor, which indicates that they tend to hold more value stocks during 
the latter part of the year. The probability of following momentum strategy is lower for   39
both risk-shifting extreme losers. Nevertheless, risk-increasing medium losers and 
extreme winners, either risk-increasing or risk-reducing have a higher probability to 
follow the momentum strategy. 
 
With regards to long-term growth funds (see Panel B), though medium losers 
increase risk by increasing their market risk exposure and not following momentum 
strategy, they concurrently hold more shares of smaller stocks and less value stocks. By 
contrast, they reduce risk by decreasing market risk exposure and follow the positive 
feedback strategy, but still holding larger shares of smaller stocks. On the other hands, 
extreme losers in this group reduce their portfolio risk by increasing the proportion of 
holding value stocks, and all extreme losers do not follow the momentum strategy. 
Furthermore, medium winners and extreme winners gamble more by taking more 
systematic risk and holding more small stocks, whereas, both of them follow the 
momentum strategy. What’s surprising is almost all kinds of managers in this category 
enhance the holding of small stock. 
 
As shown in Panel C, besides the same shifting loading on market risk as Long-term 
growth fund, Growth and Income fund have no significant change on HML. Extreme 
losers and medium losers in the growth and income funds increase their risk exposure 
by not following the momentum strategy, while both medium winners and extreme 
winners decrease risk exposure by taking on less systematic risk, by holding more 
stocks with larger market capitalization and by following the momentum strategy.   40
Similarly, like long-term growth fund almost all kinds of managers in this category 
enhance the holding of small stock for both increasing and decreasing risk exposure. 
 
Overall, as shown in the Rm-Rf column, irrespectively of losers or winners, if fund 
managers decide to increase risk, all of them raise their systematic risk exposure. By 
contrast, fund managers will reduce their systematic risk to decrease their portfolio risk. 
This also holds regardless of prior performance rankings and fund style. Similarly, 
except for decreasing-risk ones in aggressive growth funds, fund managers will hold 
more shares of small stocks to shift their risk exposure. Though the change of HML 
factor loading is not quite significant, we can identify that the one increasing-risk 
reduce the number of high value stocks, while the others enhance the holding of high 
value stocks. Furthermore, regardless of the fund style, there exists higher (lower) 
probability for winners (losers) fund managers to follow the momentum strategies.  
 
In summary, though, from Table 4 and Table 5 fund managers in all fund types adjust 
their risk taking in response to prior performance, the way fund managers alter their 
portfolio risk varies with their fund style and prior performance. When they increase 
their risk exposure by taking on more loadings on some factors, they concurrently set 
loadings on other factors. This indicates that the risk-taking behavior of mutual funds is 
quite complex and fund managers have a tendency to rebalance their portfolio to align 
the aim of reaching some target portfolio with risk taking.   41
Chapter 7 
Conclusion   42
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper first tests whether fund performance in the first part of the year explains 
the change in variance of fund returns in the second part of the year. We compute the 
variance of monthly returns for the periods during the first part of the year and the 
second part of the year. The ratio of these two numbers is then a measure of the extent 
to which fund managers change volatility toward the end of the year. We identify a 
significant increase in variance conditional on having performing well and little 
evidence that managers with worse performing increase their risk exposure, a result 
consistent with the findings of Chevalier and Ellison (1997). On the contrary, we find 
a significant reduction in variance when their prior returns are extremely poor. While 
good performers do increase variance, we find that the greatest increase in volatility 
occurs among the medium winners. This seems to imply that the cap of managerial 
compensation is a material consideration for fund managers at interim year. Another 
possible explanation arises from the U-shaped risk-return pattern of Brown, et al 
(1997). Therefore, although the outperforming managers will choose to raise risk to 
increase the option value of their compensation contract, the top performing managers 
will not raise risk. On the other hand, the reduction in variance is among the 
extremely poor performers, rather than among the medium losers. This suggests that 
the threat of dismissal following extreme poor performance prevents the fund 
managers to engage in more risk taking since it is likely that they will lose job if the   43
performance declines further by the year end. Furthermore, changes in portfolio risk 
are negatively connected with prior risk level since fund managers cannot consistently 
increase risk exposure. 
 
In comparison with the fund’s own poor prior-performance, for aggressive growth 
funds and long-term growth funds, the risk-increasing losers exhibit dramatically 
better performance than the risk-deducting losers. However, winners in growth and 
income funds cannot have significantly better performance by increasing risk 
exposure toward the end of year. Their better risk strategy is contradictory with their 
actual choice of risk. As a result, the risk-taking by fund managers may not be in the 
best interest of shareholders since the risk enhancement by winners and the risk 
reduction by losers relatively would not benefit the subsequent performance. 
 
Furthermore, the effects of risk shifting on fund performance vary with fund style. 
Specifically, the performance of aggressive growth funds is most affected by the 
choice of risk. The shareholders of aggressive growth funds can benefit from the risk 
enhancing, irrespective of prior performance. It is better for extreme losers in 
long-term growth funds to increase risk, and for medium winners in this fund type to 
reduce their risk exposure. Regarding growth and income funds, risk reduction will be 
better for all return groups.   
 
Fund managers usually increase their portfolio risk through enhance the weight of   44
market beta and small size stocks, and through following positive feedback trading in 
winners. However, their attitude on value factor is quite complex and varies with fund 
style and prior performance. 
 
Overall, the tournament system provides fund managers with the incentives to alter 
their portfolio risk in an effort to catch up with the market or lock in their yearly 
performance. This in turn changes the relative performance and such changes may not 
act in the best interest of the funds’ investors. 
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Table 1 summary statistics on return for AG, LG, and GI during sample period  
  AG            LG          GI         
Year N  Max  Min  Mean  Medium  Std.  N  Max Min  Mean Medium Std.  N  Max  Min  Mean Medium Std. 
1962 27  0.389  -0.502  -0.019  -0.016  0.085  74 0.812  -0.563 0.012 -0.009  0.682  74 0.162 -0.563  -0.011  -0.005 0.067 
1963 33  0.268  -0.046  0.020  0.015  0.040  80 0.268  -0.046 0.017  0.017  0.033  74 0.268  -0.041 0.016  0.018  0.030 
1964 33  0.211  -0.057  0.014  0.011  0.033  83  0.328  -0.751 0.012  0.011  0.038 78 0.326 -0.751  0.012  0.012 0.039 
1965 34  0.496  -0.136  0.034  0.035  0.063  86 0.149  -0.136 0.024  0.027  0.059  80 0.496  -0.236 0.017  0.023  0.043 
1966 34  0.064  -0.469  0.000  -0.007  0.091  90 0.064  -0.469  -0.002 -0.001  0.064  80  0.064 -0.469  -0.004  -0.003 0.062 
1967 45  0.970  -0.070  0.047  0.039  0.083  105 0.970  -0.113  0.033 0.030  0.060  86  0.540  -0.113  0.024 0.025  0.046 
1968 68  0.320  -0.372  0.021  0.014  0.064  132 0.229  -0.560 0.017  0.014 0.066 93 0.229  -0.560 0.015  0.013  0.062 
1969 84  0.023  -0.297  -0.011  -0.008  0.071  152 0.023  -0.444 -0.009 -0.008  0.067  96 0.981  -0.444 -0.009  -0.010  0.057 
1970 91  0.247  -0.311  -0.011  -0.001  0.076  164 0.247  -0.311 -0.006  0.003 0.069  100 0.175 -0.283  -0.001  0.009 0.062 
1971 97  0.319  -0.153  0.020  0.017  0.058  174 0.948  -0.506 0.019  0.016 0.057  105 0.948  -0.506 0.015  0.013 0.054 
1972 98  0.277  -0.132  0.010  0.007  0.041  179 0.024  -0.494 0.012  0.010 0.049  107 0.024  -0.494 0.012  0.009 0.051 
1973 100  0.328  -0.433  -0.025  -0.025  0.080  181 0.328  -0.433 -0.022  -0.021  0.069  108  0.190 -0.402  -0.016  -0.017 0.056 
1974 100  0.477  -0.524  -0.024  -0.033  0.072  180 0.276  -0.524 -0.023  -0.032  0.068  107  0.240 -0.325  -0.020  -0.028 0.063 
1975 100  0.406  -0.103  0.028  0.028  0.061  181 0.391  -0.103 0.026  0.031 0.056  108 0.346  -0.098 0.026  0.031 0.051 
1976 100  0.274  -0.102  0.022  0.014  0.053  181 0.976  -0.480 0.021  0.011 0.053  109 0.976  -0.480 0.020  0.011 0.052 
1977  100 0.163  -0.163  0.006  0.000  0.037 185  0.163 -0.089  0.003  -0.002 0.034 110  0.098 -0.080  -0.001  -0.005 0.029 
1978 104  0.279  -0.376  0.014  0.028  0.072  189 0.279  -0.376 0.012  0.023 0.063  113 0.122  -0.273 0.009  0.017 0.053 
1979 106  0.281  -0.176  0.027  0.031  0.053  193 0.201  -0.151 0.024  0.027 0.049  114 0.153  -0.126 0.019  0.023 0.043 
1980 110  0.414  -0.268  0.031  0.039  0.070  204  0.227 -0.268 0.028  0.035  0.062  123 0.182  -0.228 0.023  0.029  0.054 
1981 116  0.178  -0.160  0.001  -0.001  0.054  214 0.247  -0.155 -0.001  -0.002  0.048  129  0.136 -0.128  -0.001  -0.003 0.040 
1982 127  0.265  -0.130  0.022  0.008  0.059  230 0.934  -0.499 0.021  0.007 0.060  139 0.934  -0.499 0.020  0.007 0.057   50 
1983 146  0.305  -0.200  0.017  0.024  0.046  262 0.166  -0.171 0.016  0.022 0.040  150 0.166  -0.101 0.016  0.020 0.031 
1984 163  0.332  -0.199  -0.003  -0.006  0.050 293  0.332  -0.268  -0.001 -0.003  0.047 168  0.298 -0.268  0.003  0.002 0.040 
1985 188  0.291  -0.183  0.022  0.019  0.045  336 0.464  -0.183 0.022  0.019 0.041  191 0.140  -0.086 0.021  0.016 0.034 
1986 224  0.379  -0.232  0.010  0.017  0.053  389 0.379  -0.232 0.012  0.018 0.050  216 0.126  -0.160 0.012  0.017 0.045 
1987 266  0.324  -0.496  0.004  0.015  0.096  457 0.324  -0.496 0.005  0.018 0.090  250 0.180  -0.344 0.004  0.018 0.078 
1988 291  0.157  -0.081  0.012  0.008  0.037  502 0.240  -0.091 0.012  0.008 0.034  280 0.149  -0.089 0.012  0.010 0.029 
1989 311  0.144  -0.115  0.019  0.018  0.036  535  0.226 -0.115  0.019 0.018  0.035  299  0.114  -0.090 0.018  0.017  0.031 
1990 328  0.525  -0.298  -0.005  -0.002  0.064  582 0.276  -0.230 -0.003  -0.001  0.057  331  0.147 -0.172  -0.003  -0.002 0.049 
1991 360  0.404  -0.143  0.031  0.031  0.054  637 0.016  -0.497 0.027  0.027 0.052  365 0.016  -0.497 0.022  0.022 0.047 
1992 437  0.200  -0.139  0.009  0.010  0.039  783 0.959  -0.139 0.008  0.009 0.033  448 0.959  -0.139 0.007  0.008 0.027 
1993 570  0.211  -0.192  0.012  0.012  0.034  960  0.199 -0.201 0.009  0.010  0.029  555 0.097  -0.664 0.008  0.009  0.023 
1994 702  0.159  -0.167  -0.001  0.000  0.035  1171 0.159 -0.167  -0.001  0.001 0.031 667 0.109  -0.144 -0.001  0.004 0.028 
1995 837  0.220  -0.217  0.022  0.022  0.033  1360 0.356 -0.223  0.022  0.023 0.026 794 0.397  -0.269 0.022  0.025 0.020 
1996 1059  0.241  -0.232  0.014  0.020  0.048  1664 0.236 -0.309  0.015  0.018 0.038 934 0.147  -0.142 0.016  0.017 0.030 
1997 1332  0.304  -0.254  0.016  0.012  0.054  1996 0.304 -0.442  0.018  0.020 0.047  1094 0.326 -0.197  0.021  0.028 0.063 
1998 1549  0.404  -0.891  0.008  0.021  0.082  2357 0.333 -0.424  0.016  0.029 0.071  1301 0.197 -0.299  0.015  0.026 0.061 
1999  1732 0.556  -0.359  0.027  0.017  0.068 2699  0.511  -0.287 0.021  0.015  0.054  1426  0.630  -0.131 0.012  0.009  0.041 
2000 1902  0.609  -0.541  0.003  -0.009  0.101  3007 0.596 -0.869  -0.002  -0.010 0.076  1554 0.380 -0.541  0.000  -0.006 0.054 
2001  1963 0.756  -0.516  -0.004  0.005  0.085 3138  0.593  -0.417 -0.011  -0.006 0.072 1576 0.304 -0.366  -0.007  -0.002 0.055 
2002 1958  0.750  -0.343  -0.020  -0.022  0.065  3051 0.750 -0.273  -0.021  -0.024 0.058  1535 0.210 -0.218  -0.018  -0.016 0.055 
2003 1882  0.396  -0.333  0.028  0.025  0.043  2886 0.333 -0.333  0.023  0.018 0.036  1439 0.180 -0.081  0.021  0.015 0.034 
2004  1778 0.896  -0.179  0.011  0.017  0.039 2631  0.300  -0.232 0.009  0.013  0.030  1347  0.159  -0.133 0.009  0.012  0.029 
2005 1713  0.122  -0.200  0.006  0.004  0.038  2471 0.154 -0.188  0.006  0.003 0.030  1260 0.101 -0.188  0.005  0.003 0.024 
2006 1592  0.250  -0.500  0.010  0.010  0.036  2281 0.175 -0.500  0.009  0.012 0.027  1176 0.166 -0.500  0.011  0.014 0.021 
This table reports numbers of funds and returns within each year and within each investment objective category during the sample period.   51
Table 2  
Frequency Distributions of 2×2 Classifications of the Risk Adjustment Ratio and “Winner/Loser” 
Variables: Including December Returns (1962-2006) comparing with BHS’s results (1962-1991). 
 
Cell frequencies are reported for 4×2 classification scheme involving the rank-ordered variables: (1) the compound 
total return through the first 6 months of the year (RTN); and (2) the Risk Adjustment Ratio (RAR). RAR is the 
standard deviation measured before and after month M=6. For each year, I first divide the funds into two groups 
(losers, winners) based on RTN, and then further divide them into eight groups according to whether RAR is above 
(High) or below (Low) the medium. NOBS is denoted as the numbers of observations. The symbol “*” is denoted 
as significant at the 0.05 significance level.   
 
Year  N.OBS  Losers  Winners  2 χ  
   High  Low  High  Low   
Panel A: Full sample       
1962-2006 60473  23.04  26.94  26.98  23.04  370.75* 
1962-1991 8664  26.02  23.90  24.07  26.02  14.30* 
1992-2006 51809  22.54  27.45  27.46  22.55  499.48* 
Panel B: Aggressive Growth (AG)             
1962-2006 22703  23.60  26.34  26.46  23.60  71.37* 
1962-1991 3666  26.84  22.91  23.38  26.87  20.19* 
1992-2006 19037  22.97  27.01  27.05  22.97  125.38* 
Panel C: Long-term Growth (LG)             
1962-2006 36115  24.04  25.92  25.99  24.05  52.95* 
1962-1991 6756  26.98  22.87  23.15  27.00  42.85* 
1992-2006 29359  23.36  26.62  26.65  23.37  125.69* 
Panel D: Growth and Income (GI)             
1962-2006 19646  23.85  26.08  26.21  23.86  41.22* 
1962-1991 4100  26.37  23.39  23.85  26.39  12.46* 
1992-2006 15546  23.18  26.79  26.84  23.20  81.55* 
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Table 3  
Frequency Distributions of 4×2 Classifications of the Risk Adjustment Ratio and “Extreme and 
medium Winner/Loser” Variables: Including December Returns (1962-2006) comparing with 
BHS’s results (1962-1991). 
 
Cell frequencies are reported for 4×2 classification scheme involving the rank-ordered variables: (1) the compound 
total return through the first 6 months of the year (RTN); and (2) the Risk Adjustment Ratio (RAR). RAR is the 
standard deviation measured before and after month M. For each year, I first divide the funds into four groups 
(extreme losers, medium losers, medium winners, and extreme winners) based on RTN, and then further divide 
them into eight groups according to whether RAR is above (High) or below (Low) the medium. NOBS is denoted 
as the numbers of observations. The symbol “*” is denoted as significant at the 0.05 significance level. The symbol 
“>” (“<”) means that the left (right) hand volatility measure is greater than the right (left) hand measure at the 0.05 
significance level, respectively. 
 
 
  N.OBS  Extreme Losers  Medium Losers Medium Winners Extreme Winners  2 χ  
   High  Low  High Low  High Low  High Low   
Panel A: Full sample          
1962-2006 60473  11.17  <13.79  11.87  13.14 13.77  >11.22  13.20 11.82 409.47* 
1962-1991 8664  13.75  >11.10 12.27  12.80  12.42 12.53 11.65  <13.48 36.96* 
1992-2006 51809  10.74  <14.24  11.80  13.20  14.00 >11.00 13.46 >11.55 557.46* 
Panel B: Aggressive Growth (AG)             
1962-2006 22703  11.28  <13.65  12.32  12.69  13.12 11.84 13.34  >11.76 90.04* 
1962-1991 3666  13.94  >10.75 12.90  12.17  12.22 12.63 11.16  <14.24 29.81* 
1992-2006 19037  10.76  <14.21  12.21  12.80  13.29 11.69 13.76  >11.28  159.44* 
Panel C: Long-term Growth (LG)             
1962-2006 36115  11.57  <13.39  12.47  12.53 13.29  >11.70  12.71 12.34 85.92* 
1962-1991 6756  14.17  >10.67 12.82  12.20  12.02 12.94 11.13  <14.06 59.50* 
1992-2006 29359  10.97  <14.01  12.39  12.61  13.58 >11.42 13.07 >11.95 178.50* 
Panel D: Growth and Income (GI)             
1962-2006 19646  11.54  <13.37  12.30  12.71 13.70  >11.29  12.52 12.57 72.85* 
1962-1991 4100  13.49  11.20  12.88  12.20  13.05 11.90 10.80  <14.49  33.56* 
1992-2006 15546  11.03  <13.94  12.15  12.85 13.87  >11.13  12.97 12.06 107.20*   53
Table 4  
Frequency Distributions of 4×2 Classifications of the Risk Adjustment Ratio and “Winner/Loser” 
Variables: Including December Returns (1962-2006) 
 
Cell frequencies are reported for 4×2 classification scheme involving the rank-ordered variables: (1) the compound 
total return through the first M months of the year (RTN); and (2) the Risk Adjustment Ratio (RAR). RAR is the 
standard deviation measured before and after month M. For each year, we first divide the funds into four groups 
(extreme losers, medium losers, medium winners, and extreme winners) based on RTN, and then further divide 
them into eight groups according to whether RAR is above (High) or below (Low) the medium. We employ three 
different values for the interim performance assessment date: M = 6, 7, and 8. NOBS is denoted as the numbers of 
observations. The symbol “*” is denoted as significant at the 0.05 significance level. The symbol “>” (“<”) means 
that the left (right) hand volatility measure is greater than the right (left) hand measure at the 0.05 significance 
level, respectively. 
 
  N.OBS  Extreme Losers  Medium Losers Medium Winners Extreme Winners  2 χ  
   High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low   
Panel A: Full sample         
(6,6) 62135  11.17  <13.79  11.87 13.14 13.77  >11.22 13.2  11.82  409.47*
(7,5)   11.33  <13.63  11.94  13.07  13.75 >11.24 12.99  12.03  337.95*
(8,4)   11.41  <13.57  12.43  12.58  13.02 >11.97 13.15 >11.87  185.21*
Panel B: Aggressive Growth (AG)        
(6,6) 23215  11.28  <13.65  12.32 12.69 13.12 11.84 13.34  >11.76  90.04* 
(7,5)   11.82  <13.11  11.93  13.1 12.94  12.03  13.36  >11.72  85.90* 
(8,4)   11.38  <13.54  11.61  <13.4  13.46 >11.52 13.60 >11.48  147.7* 
Panel C: Long-term Growth (LG)        
(6,6)  36970 11.57 <13.39  12.47  12.53  13.29 >11.7 12.71 12.34  85.90* 
(7,5)   11.51  <13.44  12.21  12.79  13.35 >11.64 12.95  12.09  113.61*
(8,4)   11.11  <13.84  12.45  12.57  13.28 >11.70 13.19 >11.86  171.26*
Panel D: Growth and Income (GI)             
(6,6) 20153  11.54  <13.37 12.3  12.71 13.7  >11.29  12.52  12.57  72.86* 
(7,5)   11.37  <13.59  12.26  12.75  13.25 >11.73 13.15  11.60 132.1* 
(8,4)   12.38  12.53  12.15  12.87  13.07 >11.91 12.47  12.62 15.24*   54
Table 5  
Frequency Distributions of 4×2 Classifications of the Risk Adjustment Ratio and “Winner/Loser” 
Variables: Excluding December Returns   
 
Cell frequencies are reported for 4×2 classification scheme involving the rank-ordered variables: (1) the compound 
total return through the first M months of the year (RTN); and (2) the Risk Adjustment Ratio (RAR). RAR is the 
standard deviation measured before and after month M. For each year, we first divide the funds into four groups 
(extreme losers, medium losers, medium winners, and extreme winners) based on RTN, and then further divide 
them into eight groups according to whether RAR is above (High) or below (Low) the medium. We employ three 
different values for the interim performance assessment date: M = 6, 7, and 8. NOBS is denoted as the numbers of 
observations. The symbol “*” is denoted as significant at the 0.05 significance level. The symbol “>” (“<”) means 
that the left (right) hand volatility measure is greater than the right (left) hand measure at the 0.05 significance 
level, respectively. 
 
 N.OBS  Extreme  Losers  Medium  Losers  Medium Winners  Extreme Winners  2 χ  
    High  Low High  Low High  Low High  Low   
Panel A: Full sample               
(6,5) 60799  10.90  <14.08  12.30  12.71 13.91 >11.08  12.91  12.12  458.1* 
(7,4)   10.75 <14.22  12.62  12.39 13.62 >11.37  13.03  12.01  445.6* 
(8,3)   10.42 <14.56  12.73  12.28 13.96 >11.03  12.91  12.12  648.5* 
Panel B: Aggressive Growth (AG)             
(6,5) 22690  11.56  <13.35  12.31  12.71 13.14 >11.97  13.04  11.91  54.42* 
(7,4)   11.64 <13.28  12.01  13.01 13.04  11.93 13.35  >11.73  68.69* 
(8,3)   11.10 <13.82  11.57  <13.46 13.53  >11.44 13.86  >11.22  203.15* 
Panel C: Long-term Growth (LG)             
(6,5) 36340  11.25  <13.71  12.63  12.38 13.47 >11.51  12.68  12.36  145.46* 
(7,4)   10.87 <14.08  12.31  12.70  13.64 >11.35  13.21  11.83  255.04* 
(8,3)   10.52 <14.44  12.39  12.62  13.73 >11.24  13.39  >11.66  358.45* 
Panel D: Growth and Income (GI)           
(6,5) 19622  11.02  <13.90  12.53  12.47 13.95 >11.04  12.57  12.52  132.24* 
(7,4)   11.57 <13.35  12.14  12.86 13.29 >11.80  13.07  11.92  56.98* 
(8,3)   11.63 <13.28  12.65  12.34 13.23 >11.75  12.56  12.52  39.62* 
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Table 6   
Regression Analysis: The Relationship between Risk Adjustments and Other Related Variables   
 
This table shows the estimated coefficients for various forms of the following regression:   
,, 1 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 2 4 , 5 ,
6,7 , 9 , 1 0 , ,
/
() ( )
it it it it it it it
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Where  ,1 it ret −  is interim return,  ,1 it std −  is interim risk,  ,2 it ret − is past one year cumulative return (1Yr), 
past three year cumulative return (Cum(3Yr));  , it Size  and  , it Age  are the log of total net assets and age of 
fund i in period t, respectively. Besides, turnover ratio ( , it Turn ) and expense fee ( , it Exp ) are also included. 
, () it I Single  is defined as a binary variable with the value of 1 if a fund is single managed, and 0 otherwise. 
The t-statistics is shown in the parenthesis. * represents significant at the 0.05 significance level. 
 
 Full  sample  AG  LG  GI 
  1Yr  Cum (3Yr)  1Yr  Cum (3Yr) 1Yr  Cum (3Yr) 1Yr  Cum (3Yr)
Intercept   1.834 1.822 1.814  1.8  2.043 2.053 1.912  1.939 
  (39.41)* (39.10)* (35.61)* (35.37)* (14.10)* (14.17)* (11.56)*  (11.62)* 
,1 it ret −   0.276 1.021 0.266 0.856 -0.173 0.059 -5.253  -3.896 
  (0.65) (2.61)* (0.58) (2.02)* (-0.12) (0.04)  (-2.35)*  (-1.69) 
,1 it std −   -9.562 -9.544 -8.803 -8.862  -13.714 -13.16 -17.678  -18.359 
  (-35.10)* (-34.10)* (-30.74)* (-30.22)* (-13.04)* (-12.05)* (-10.49)*  (-11.05)*
,2 it ret −   0.191 0.049 0.162 0.079 -0.118  -0.097  0.394  -0.073 
  (4.79)* (2.15)* (3.83)* (3.25)* (-0.94) (-1.49) (2.10)*  (-0.71) 
, it Size   0.013 0.012 0.008 0.005 0.041 0.045 0.021  0.028 
 (2.79)*  (2.53)*  (1.59)  (0.91)  (3.08)* (3.30)* (1.28)  (1.66) 
, it Age   -0.03 -0.028  -0.022  -0.018 -0.072 -0.078 0.002 0.005 
 (-2.18)*  (-2.01)*  (-1.46)  (-1.18)  (-1.89) (-2.03)* (0.04)  (0.12) 
, it Turn   0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.006  0.005 
 (2.62)*  (2.48)*  (1.46)  (1.57)  (1.46) (1.45) (1.56)  (1.31) 
, () it I Load   0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 -0.016 -0.017 -0.003  -0.005 
  (0.78) (0.81) (1.51) (1.52) (-1.70) (-1.71) (-0.22)  (-0.37) 
, it Exp   1.839 1.823 2.326 2.376 -2.061 -2.362 1.231 0.889 
  (3.09)* (3.05)* (3.41)* (3.48)* (-0.68) (-0.77)  (0.85)  (0.6) 
, () it I Single   -0.052 -0.047 -0.077 -0.078 0.041  0.05  0.001 0.033 
 (-2.06)*  (-1.85)  (-2.76)*  (-2.79)*  (0.59) (0.71) (0.01)  (0.36) 
Adj. 
2 R   0.1761 0.1736 0.1758  0.175  0.2363 0.2377 0.1817  0.1772 
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Table 7   
Return Differences between Increasing Risk and Decreasing Risk for Various Types of Mutual Funds   
 
This table presents the differences in both raw returns and risk-adjusted returns during July and November and their corresponding t-values within the sample quintile for three US domestic 
equity funds: Aggressive Growth (AG), Long-term Growth (LG), and Growth Income (GI). Difference denotes the return of high risk minus the return of low risk within the same return 
quartile. All return values are presented in percentile. The t-value is shown in the parenthesis. 
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   Raw Returns  One-factor Alpha  Four-factor Alpha 
%    Increasing  Decreasing Difference t-statistics Increasing Decreasing Difference F-statistics Increasing Decreasing Difference F-statistics 
Panel A    Full sample              
Full    1.091   0.877   0.214   (0.31)  0.004   -0.161   0.165   (1.4)  -0.073   -0.193   0.120   (0.73) 
    (2.19)  (1.85)    (0.04)  (-1.29)    (-0.96)  (-1.95)    
Extreme  Loser 0.864   0.683   0.181   (0.26)  -0.243   -0.341   0.098   (0.66)  -0.087   -0.252   0.165   (2.03) 
    (1.67)  (1.43)     (-1.85)  (-2.02)    (-0.84)  (-1.84)    
Medium  Loser 0.963   0.869   0.094   (0.14)  -0.108   -0.133   0.025   (0.04)  -0.093   -0.137   0.044   (0.13) 
    (1.99)  (1.94)    (-1.4)  (-1.18)    (-1.31)  (-1.44)    
Medium  Winner 1.043   0.947   0.097   (0.14)  -0.030   -0.072   0.042   (0.11)  -0.132   -0.192   0.060   (0.21) 
    (2.14)  (2.06)     (-0.32)  (-0.63)    (-1.75)  (-2.05)    
Extreme  Winner 1.278   1.041   0.237   (0.33)  0.177   0.001   0.176   (1.13)  -0.067   -0.216   0.149   (0.68) 
   (2.44)  (2.12)     (1.06)  (0.01)     (-0.57)  (-1.58)    
Panel B    Aggressive Growth Funds            
Full    1.306 0.889 0.417  (0.53)  0.173 -0.226  0.399  (4.84)** -0.002  -0.268  0.266  (1.92) 
    (2.32)  (1.61)    (0.77)  (-1.00)    (-0.02)  (-1.94)    
Extreme  Loser 0.926 0.546 0.381  (0.47)  -0.232  -0.558  0.326 (3.3)* -0.058 -0.400 0.342  (3.08)* 
    (1.59)  (0.99)     (-0.98)  (-2.34)     (-0.34)  (-2.3)    
Medium  Loser 1.253 0.852 0.402  (0.51)  0.110 -0.254  0.364 (4.07)**  0.0071  -0.340  0.347  (3.11)* 
    (2.21)  (1.55)     (0.5)  (-1.11)     (0.05)  (-2.29)    
Medium  Winner 1.288 0.973 0.315  (0.4)  0.146 -0.124  0.270  (2.19) -0.071 -0.251  0.180 (0.84) 
    (2.26)  (1.8)     (0.64)  (-0.54)    (-0.56)  (-1.77)    
Extreme  Winner 1.537 1.388 0.148  (0.18)  0.385 0.305 0.079 (0.24) 0.047  0.027  0.020 (0.01) 
   (2.54)  (2.49)    (1.3)  (1.09)    (0.28)  (0.17)    
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   Raw Returns  One-factor Alpha  Four-factor Alpha 
   Increasing  Decreasing Difference t-statistics Increasing Decreasing Difference F-statistics Increasing Decreasing Difference F-statistics 
Panel C    Long-term Growth Funds               
Full    1.028   0.895   0.132   (0.19)  -0.076   -0.145   0.069   (0.34)  -0.122   -0.164   0.042   (0.13) 
    (2.03)  (1.91)     (-0.86)  (-1.43)    (-1.81)  (-1.79)    
Extreme  Loser 0.834   0.707   0.126   (0.18)  -0.298   -0.329   0.031   (0.07)  -0.110   -0.215   0.105   (1.07) 
    (1.57)  (1.47)     (-2.37)  (-2.18)    (-1.00)  (-1.63)    
Medium  Loser 0.879   0.922   -0.043   (-0.06)  -0.213   -0.082   -0.131   (1.71)  -0.140   -0.082   -0.058   (0.35) 
    (1.77)  (2.07)     (-2.88)  (-0.87)    (-2.07)  (-0.93)    
Medium  Winner 0.965   1.001  -0.036   (-0.07)  -0.087   -0.047   -0.040   (0.1)  -0.159   -0.133   -0.026   (0.04) 
    (2.14)  (2.01)     (-1.06)  (-0.49)    (-2.63)  (-1.41)    
Extreme  Winner 1.315   1.092   0.223   (0.3)  0.186   0.025   0.161   (1.38)  -0.047   -0.183   0.136   (0.87) 
    (2.43)  (2.19)    (1.1)  (0.16)     (-0.39)  (-1.57)    
Panel D    Growth and Income Funds                   
Full    0.919   0.903   0.016   (0.03)  -0.089   -0.029   -0.060   (0.4)  -0.117   -0.067   -0.050   (0.38) 
    (2.08)  (2.23)     (-1.83)  (-0.28)    (-2.71)  (-0.96)    
Extreme  Loser 0.778   0.763   0.015   (0.02)  -0.231   -0.160   -0.071   (0.44)  -0.147   -0.111   -0.036   (0.15) 
    (1.75)  (1.86)     (-3.15)  (-1.1)     (-2.36)  (-1.02)    
Medium  Loser 0.858   0.922   -0.065   (-0.11)  -0.143   -0.005   -0.138   (3.09)*  -0.116   -0.023   -0.093   (2.2) 
    (1.96)  (2.3)      (-2.58)  (-0.05)    (-2.5)  (-0.35)    
Medium  Winner 0.886   0.905   -0.019   (-0.02)  -0.104   -0.037   -0.067   (0.88)  -0.132   -0.080   -0.052   (0.62) 
    (2.04)  (2.23)     (-1.63)  (-0.39)    (-2.56)  (-1.23)    
Extreme  Winner 1.076   1.078   -0.001   (-0.01)  0.053   0.146   -0.093   (0.69)  -0.093   -0.056   -0.037   (0.12) 
    (2.37)  (2.65)     (0.77)  (1.23)     (-1.51)  (-0.54)      59 
Table 8   
How to shift the risk through market factors 
 
This table shows the relative changing the factor loadings about the Carhart’s (1997) four-factor portfolio for various fund type. Panels A, B, and C show the results for aggressive growth funds 
(AG), long-term growth funds (LG), and growth and income funds (GI), respectively. DR represents that fund managers decrease risk, and IR denotes that fund managers increase risk. B2 
means coefficient of previous part of the year, B1 is the latter part of the year. Asterisk represents significant at 0.1 significant level. T-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 
    Rm-Rf      SMB      HML      UMD     
   B2  B1  Diff  F-stat  B2  B1  Diff  F-stat  B2 B1  Diff  F-stat  B2 B1  Diff  F-stat 
Aggressive Growth                     
FULL  IR  1.042   0.951   0.091   (10.69)  * 0.572   0.288   0.284   (62.6)  *  -0.046 -0.008 -0.038 (0.85)  0.130   0.088   0.042   (2.39) 
  DR  0.891   1.078   -0.187  (44.57)  * 0.528   0.522   0.006   (0.02)  -0.019  -0.153  0.134   (10.45)  * 0.107   0.086   0.021   (0.61) 
EL  IR  1.036   0.995   0.041   (1.08)  0.500   0.186   0.314   (38.53)  * -0.162  -0.105  -0.056  (0.91) -0.122 0.045    -0.167  (19.06)  * 
  DR  0.820   1.052   -0.233  (23.68)  * 0.483   0.391   0.091   (2.33)  -0.125  -0.305  0.180   (6.58) *  -0.116  0.049    -0.165  (12.97) * 
ML  IR  1.033   0.943   0.090   (8.5)  *  0.549   0.255   0.294   (51.67) * -0.025  -0.033  0.007    (0.02)  0.094   0.056   0.038   (1.52) 
  DR  0.901   1.067   -0.166  (29.56)  * 0.514   0.494   0.020   (0.26)  0.001   -0.145  0.147   (10.09)  * 0.068   0.108   -0.040  (1.75) 
MW  IR  1.043   0.933   0.110   (14.36)  * 0.557   0.288   0.269   (49.26)  * -0.015  0.010   -0.025  (0.32)  0.190   0.080   0.110   (14.64)  * 
  DR  0.899   1.071   -0.172  (24.4)  *  0.504   0.555   -0.051  (1.3)  0.008   -0.107  0.115   (4.89)  *  0.162   0.140   0.022   (0.42) 
EW  IR  1.049   0.940   0.109   (7.55)  *  0.658   0.363   0.295   (30.06)  * 0.008   0.009   -0.001  (0.01)  0.347   0.131   0.215   (29.27)  * 
  DR  0.921   1.074   -0.153  (16.05)  * 0.639   0.688   -0.049  (1.03)  0.014   0.007   0.006   (0.01)  0.307   0.142   0.165   (20.19)  * 
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    Rm-Rf      SMB      HML      UMD     
   B2  B1  Diff  F-stat  B2  B1  Diff  F-stat  B2 B1  Diff  F-stat  B2 B1  Diff  F-stat 
Long-term  Growth                 
FULL  IR  1.031   0.925   0.106   (28.25)  * 0.252   0.096   0.156   (36.87)  * -0.073 -0.030 -0.043  (36.87)  * 0.055   0.058   -0.003  (0.03) 
  DR  0.883   1.072   -0.189  (71.94)  * 0.250   0.162   0.088   (9.51)  *  -0.016  -0.066  0.050   (2.27)  0.058   0.017   0.042   (3.7)  
EL  IR  1.016   0.939   0.077   (7.07)  *  0.223   0.056   0.168   (20.36)  * -0.169  -0.118  -0.052 (1.43) -0.136 0.028    -0.164  (33.66)  * 
  DR  0.844   1.086   -0.242  (45.57)  * 0.261   0.081   0.180   (16.46)  * -0.067  -0.170  0.103   (3.88) *  -0.107  -0.026  -0.080  (5.52) * 
ML  IR  1.013   0.917   0.097   (22.99)  * 0.186   0.030   0.157   (36.5)  *  -0.067  -0.065  -0.002 (0.01) -0.003 0.011    -0.015 (0.57) 
  DR  0.882   1.075   -0.193  (69.57)  * 0.186   0.046   0.140   (22.73)  * 0.007   -0.041  0.048   (1.94)  0.007   -0.002  0.009   (0.15) 
MW  IR  1.027   0.920   0.107   (34.34)  * 0.205   0.076   0.129   (28.4)  *  -0.072  -0.006  -0.066  (5.46)  *  0.099   0.066   0.033   (3.39) 
  DR  0.888   1.072   -0.184  (59.63)  * 0.216   0.128   0.089   (8.05)  *  0.015   0.014   0.001   (0.01)  0.100   0.030   0.070   (8.94)  * 
EW  IR  1.064   0.925   0.139   (22.52)  * 0.350   0.170   0.180   (21.41) * -0.026  0.015    -0.041  (0.84)  0.242   0.096   0.146   (25.43)  * 
  DR  0.906   1.043   -0.137  (13.43)  * 0.356   0.409   -0.053  (1.31)  0.003   0.011   -0.007  (0.02)  0.238   0.099   0.139   (15.14)  * 
Growth  and  Income                 
FULL  IR  0.982   0.860   0.123   (68.94)  * 0.061   -0.008  0.069   (13.09)  * 0.058   0.078   -0.020  (0.8)  -0.001  0.028   -0.029  (4.17)  * 
  DR  0.855   1.015   -0.160  (69.02)  * 0.056   -0.053  0.109   (19.98)  * 0.134   0.109   0.025  (0.75)  -0.008  -0.057  0.049    (7.07)  * 
EL  IR  0.955   0.879   0.076   (6.15)  *  0.051   -0.002  0.053   (1.83)  -0.008  0.004   -0.012 (0.07) -0.142 0.010    -0.152  (26.77)  * 
  DR  0.814   1.022   -0.208  (40.6)  *  0.061   -0.084  0.145   (13.15)  * 0.112   0.021   0.090   (3.64)  -0.107  -0.080  -0.027  (0.76) 
ML  IR  0.980   0.881   0.099   (39.32)  * 0.035   -0.053  0.088   (18.64)  * 0.045   0.029   0.016   (0.45)  -0.046  -0.015  -0.031  (4.1)  * 
  DR  0.854   1.018   -0.165  (68.51)  * 0.038   -0.079  0.116   (20.8)  *  0.122   0.102   0.020   (0.44) -0.050 -0.046 -0.005 (0.06) 
MW  IR  1.004   0.892   0.113   (48.3)  *  0.045   -0.014  0.059   (7.41)  *  0.064   0.096   -0.032  (1.63)  0.026   0.025   0.001   (0.01) 
  DR  0.864   1.011   -0.147  (53.56)  * 0.047   -0.053  0.100   (14.52)  * 0.125   0.108   0.017   (0.33)  0.013   -0.032  0.045   (5.45)  * 
EW  IR  0.973   0.869   0.104   (12.57)  * 0.186   0.066   0.120   (9.26)  *  0.021   0.103   -0.082  (3.17)  0.151   0.068   0.083   (8.44)  * 
  DR  0.881   1.017   -0.136  (17.76)  * 0.150   0.076   0.074   (3.39)  0.179   0.230   -0.051  (1.16)  0.125   -0.018  0.143   (22.03)  * 
 